Every two weeks, a business-school case-study of one boardroom decision that reshaped a North American industry. Sears missed e-commerce. Blockbuster declined to buy Netflix. Kodak vetoed the digital camera.
A case study of Sony’s early digital-music strategy, the internal conflict around ATRAC3 and MP3, the outcome, and a disciplined interoperable counterfactual.
A case study of the AOL–Time Warner merger, the dissent it ignored, the damage that followed, and the narrower partnership path the boards could have tested instead.
Kodak invented digital photography, then kept asking digital to protect the film business. This episode reconstructs the decision logic, the dissent, the outcome, and the narrower counterfactual.
In 1996, Polaroid kept instant film at the center while digital imaging stayed an extension. The company saw the threat early, but its boardroom logic made the transition too slow.
In 2001, Borders paid Amazon to run Borders.com, treating online retail as a costly side business rather than the next customer relationship. This episode reconstructs why the decision looked rational, how the seven-year partnership damaged Borders' ability to rebuild, and what Barnes & Noble shows about the narrower path not taken.
In August 2019, WeWork's board made a choice: proceed with an IPO that any independent director should have stopped. This episode reconstructs the decision moment — Adam Neumann's 20:1 supervoting shares, the all-male board with no commercial real estate expertise, and $20.9 million in self-dealing transactions — documents the dissent already in the room, then follows the outcome from a $47 billion valuation to Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and asks the disciplined question: what would proper board governance have changed?
In 1994, Quaker Oats paid $1.7 billion for Snapple — and Wall Street hated it from day one. Twenty-seven months later, the company sold Snapple for $300 million, booked a $1.4 billion loss, and pushed out a CEO who had been there sixteen years. This episode reconstructs the decision moment, the dissent already on the table, the collapse that followed, and what a credible counterfactual actually looks like — because Triarc bought the same brand and turned it into $1.45 billion in under three years.
In 1976, Steve Jobs walked into his former boss's office at Atari and made one of the most consequential pitches in business history: $50,000 for a third of Apple Computer. Nolan Bushnell said no. That same year, Apple's third co-founder, Ron Wayne, sold his 10 percent stake for $800. Both decisions happened before Apple had sold a single Apple II. This episode reconstructs the decision moment, the near-total absence of recorded dissent, the staggering financial outcomes, and a disciplined counterfactual — including Bushnell's own argument that his refusal may actually have helped Apple succeed.
In summer 2006, Yahoo's CEO put a billion dollars in front of a 22-year-old Mark Zuckerberg. Zuckerberg's own board wanted him to take it. This episode reconstructs the decision moment, the dissent inside and outside the boardroom, Yahoo's financial collapse in the years that followed, and a disciplined counterfactual grounded in Yahoo's own acquisition record.
In early 1999, Larry Page and Sergey Brin walked into Excite's offices willing to sell Google for less than a million dollars. CEO George Bell said no — not over price, but because Page demanded that Excite tear out its own search technology. This episode reconstructs that exact moment: who was in the room, why Bell refused, the one dissenter who tried to change his mind, what happened to Excite in the thirty months that followed, and whether Bell's decision actually stopped Google at all.
In September 2000, Netflix walked into Blockbuster HQ and offered to sell for $50 million. The CEO struggled not to laugh. Eleven years later, Blockbuster filed for bankruptcy. This episode reconstructs the boardroom moment — the decision, the dissent, the numbers, and the counterfactual.
